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Purpose: The purpose of this research is to identify institutions and market forces through 
discourses concerning central and local wage-formation. This study’s objective 
is to contribute to the research field of wage-formation with insights, 
descriptions and plausible explanations into what discourses and discrepancies 
in discourses surrounding the Mark is present. 
Theory: Institutional theory, Varieties of capitalism 
Method: Qualitative semi-structured interviews and thematic coding displayed with 
inspiration from discourse analysis as a method 
Result: The found discourses are thematised into: The Mark as political, The Mark as 
legitimacy, The Mark as ideology and Challenging the Mark. These themes 
describe ambiguity towards the presence and role of the Mark; The deep rooted 
tradition of using the Mark as norm (with individual incentives); And local 
social partners evolving role; from traditional opposition towards being a co-
partner for employers in creating a legitimate wage process in the societal 
context going from collectivism towards individualisation. 
 
  
 
II 
 
 
Foreword 
The journey of composing a master thesis is dependent upon accessibility to relevant 
respondents possessing explicit knowledge concerning sought phenomenons. This research 
originally set out to research Swedish engineering consultancy organisations ability to 
perform strategic wage-formation in the local context. However, as with life in general - 
things happen and you are forced to adapt your work to contextual factors, such as empirical 
saturation etcetera. With this in mind, we chose to focus our research towards the notion of 
the Mark (also known as the wage-formation mark or industry export-mark) in the context of 
wage-formation on the Swedish engineering consultancy market. Thereby, our focus in this 
paper is to show how different actors (i.e. employers and/or social partners on peak level) 
talk, discuss and relate to the mark when speaking of wage-formation. To have written this 
product as a pair has given a deeper level of understanding of the researched phenomena, as 
every part included has been extensively and thoroughly discussed in order to reach adequate 
conclusions.  
We would like to thank all involved respondents in giving us access to your time and explicit 
knowledge within the area of study. We would also like to thank our tutor Ylva Ulfsdotter 
Eriksson, without your informed support and reality checks this thesis would not have been 
possible to perform. 
Kind regards, 
Alexandra Hultberg & Henrik Örtberg 
2019-06-04, University of Gothenburg 
 
 
 
  
 
III 
Table of content 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
Research questions .............................................................................................................. 2 
Background of wage-formation .................................................................................................. 2 
Central wage negotiations ................................................................................................... 3 
The mark as instruction ....................................................................................................... 4 
Critique against “the mark” as norm ............................................................................... 5 
Local wage-formation ............................................................................................................. 5 
Flexible wage models .......................................................................................................... 6 
Social partners ........................................................................................................................ 7 
Theory ........................................................................................................................................ 9 
Institutional theory .................................................................................................................. 9 
Coordinated market economies and Liberal market economies ........................................... 10 
Method ..................................................................................................................................... 11 
Data collection ...................................................................................................................... 12 
Population ......................................................................................................................... 12 
Interviews .......................................................................................................................... 13 
Interview guide .............................................................................................................. 13 
Analytical approach .............................................................................................................. 14 
Thematisation .................................................................................................................... 14 
Credibility and transferability ............................................................................................... 14 
Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 15 
Ethical considerations ........................................................................................................... 16 
Results ...................................................................................................................................... 16 
1. The mark as political ........................................................................................................ 17 
Market stability ................................................................................................................. 17 
IV 
The Mark’s effect for Employers ...................................................................................... 18 
2. The mark as legitimacy ..................................................................................................... 19 
The search for legitimacy .................................................................................................. 20 
The role of social partners ................................................................................................. 22 
3. The mark as ideology ........................................................................................................ 23 
Rhetoric’s in wage-formation ........................................................................................... 23 
Transcending historic influences ...................................................................................... 24 
4. Challenging the existence of the mark .............................................................................. 26 
Towards individualisation ................................................................................................. 27 
Discussion ................................................................................................................................ 28 
Macro-level ........................................................................................................................... 29 
Meso-level ............................................................................................................................ 30 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 30 
Practical implications ............................................................................................................ 31 
Final reflections .................................................................................................................... 31 
References ................................................................................................................................ 32 
Appendix 1. Interview guide .................................................................................................... 35 
 
 
1 
Introduction 
Wage-formation is crucial for both Swedish economy and corporate development. Labour 
compensation can be linked to both inflation and corporate competitiveness as well as being 
the largest fixed cost for companies today (Karlsson, Lindberg, Stern, Lundqvist & Larsson, 
2014). Since 1997, wage-formation is departed from The Industry agreement, a joint 
agreement between the industry employers and social partners (trade unions and employer 
organisations, henceforth known as SP’s). This agreement sets the terms for sustainable wage-
formation for most parts of the labour market (Industriradet, 2017). 
Besides being a stabilising national-economic factor, using the export-mark (henceforth 
known as the Mark) as norm creates a consensus between involved SP’s. However, the Mark 
is currently being discussed amongst SP’s in different sectors where critics claim the rigidity 
of the Industry agreement leave little room for business near (local) solutions. Instead the 
Mark manifests differences in salary levels between occupational groups and genders 
(Calmfors, 2018; Gunnars, 2017, December 14). According to Calmfors (2018) more 
consideration needs to be taken to the state of the labour market rather than the industry 
export when setting the recommended levels of salary increase. The Mark is thus a norm that 
is beginning to be scrutinised amongst several industrial relation parties (Hermansson, 2019). 
Stefan Koskinen, head of employer politics at Almega, calls for numberless agreements as an 
alternative arguing that increased globalisation and the diverse organisational conditions of 
today makes the industry norm obsolete (Gunnars, 2018, January 24). On the other hand 
Anders Weihe, head of negotiations at Teknikföretagen, describes not following the norm of 
the Mark as breach of contract that should lead to fines for employers agreeing to terms above 
the Mark (Jelmin & Tun Hedfors, 2019, May 3; Lindström, 2019, May 3).  
Navigating between using the Mark as norm and business near (local) agreements becomes a 
paradoxical task for employers creating a spill-over effect on reward schema offerings, 
making local wage-formation a complex HRM strategy in motivating and retaining 
employees (Froese, Hitotsuyanagi-Hansel, Peltokorpi & Varma, 2018; Karlsson et. al., 2014; 
Sethunga & Perera, 2018).   
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This article investigates discourses of how engineering consultancy employers (henceforth 
known as Employers) and SP’s on peak level relate to-, talk about- and use the Mark in 
relation to wage-formation. The Swedish engineering consultancy sector is interesting to 
study due to the frequently occurring agreements containing individual fall back guarantees 
(stupstock) (Medlingsinstitutet, 2019); as well as EFCA’s (2018) identification of current and 
future challenges of labour scarcity and high salary demand within the market (cf. Lindström, 
2017, november 3; Myrén, 2018, may 30). The purpose of this research is to identify 
institutions and market forces through discourses concerning central and local wage-
formation. This study’s objective is to contribute to previous research of wage-formation (e.g. 
Lundh, 2010; Karlsson et. al., 2014; Bengtsson, 2008; Björklund, Edin, Fredriksson, 
Holmlund & Wadensjö, 2014; Granqvist & Regnér, 2016, 2015, 2009, 2008, 2004; Karlström 
& Regnér, 2017) with insights, descriptions and plausible explanations into what discourses 
and discrepancies in discourses surrounding the Mark is present. The study answers the 
following questions: 
Research questions 
1. What discourses regarding central and local wage-formation is identified? 
2. What discrepancies can be identified in the discourse(s) between Employers and SP’s 
when it comes to wage formation? 
3. How does the discourse(s) of wage-formation impact local employers ability to use 
strategic wage-formation? 
 
This article will begin with background and previous research into wage-formation, described 
through historical and present developments in the industrial relations on the Swedish labour 
market. Second, the theoretical framework of institutional theory and varieties of capitalism is 
outlined; leading into descriptions of used methods, choices- and considerations made for this 
study. Third, the presentation of empirical data and connection to previous research leads into 
the theoretical discussion, conclusions, implications and final thoughts. 
Background of wage-formation 
To understand the complexity of wage-formation, one needs to grasp the duality of employer 
goals in keeping fixed costs low, while at the same time provide sufficient reward schemas to 
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keep stakeholders (i.e. shareholders, investors, employees’) invested in the business 
(Björklund, Edin, Fredriksson, Holmlund & Wadensjö, 2014). Avoiding transactional cost 
(e.g. costs of negotiations, control and follow-up) is an incitement for employers to create 
ongoing processes, and build relationships with SP’s in relation to local wage-formation and 
salary setting in the organisation (Björklund et. al., 2014; Karlsson et. al., 2014; Lundh, 
2010).  
The December agreement (established 1906) gave SP’s the right to form associations, sign 
collective agreements and be part of negotiations concerning wage-formation (Lundh, 2010). 
For employers this agreement gave the benefit of sectorial uniformism - also known as 
solidaric wage competitiveness - inhibiting trade unions’ ability to instigate wage increases 
amongst employers competing of the same labour force (Lundh, 2010). 
The Saltsjöbad agreement (established 1938) was key in creating the collective agreements 
and its regulations of moderate wage demands and peace on the labour market (Lundh, 2010). 
The agreement, setting the terms of the Swedish model, was characterised by collaborations 
and consensus between SP’s as well as a strong degree of organisation (on both employee and 
employer side). As per the Saltsjöbad agreement, wage-formation was to be decided between 
SP’s without governmental influence. Additionally wage-formation should be centralised and 
sustainable, taking macro-economic stability into account. As an effect, the central 
negotiations between SP’s on peak level gradually increased between the 1940’s and 1960’s 
(Lundh, 2010). 
Collectively regulated wages was seen as cost-effective amongst employers leading to less 
conflict concerning wage expectations and jealousy amongst employees (Lundh, 2010). 
Centralised wage-formation and the Rehn-Meidner model (“equal pay for equal work”), 
introduced in the late 1940s, also contributed to increased labour mobility, harmonized wage-
formation and decreased wage drifts - i.e. solidaric wages. To secure sustainable wage-
formation, it became the states responsibility to keep inflation low via taxes limiting the profit 
margins of companies (Lundh, 2010).  
Central wage negotiations 
The paradigm of central wage-negotiations (1950s-1980s) helped decrease wage differences 
between sectors. The industry, due to its competitive exposure became the norm, and the 
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wage space determined by sectorial productivity development - also known as the EFO model 
- named after its creators Edgren (TCO), Faxén (SAF), Odhner (LO) (Lund, 2010). During 
this era, monopolistic wage-formation was part of the practice and trade unions used their 
membership numbers as strength when negotiating terms towards employers (Björklund et. 
al., 2014). According to Björklund et. al. (2014) the model of monopolistic wage-formation 
gave SP’s the right to exclusively determine wages making it unrealistic in today’s 
interdependent labour market. 
When the service sector began to increase in the mid 1980s, wage differentiation increased 
and the model of central wage-formation transformed towards decentralised local 
arrangement and pay for performance (Lundh, 2010). The transformation was partly due to 
the recession in the 1990s following a period of high inflation, labour discrepancy and 
economic boom of the 1980s. But it was also because the central agreements of wage-
formation began to function as the floor in local practice, increasing wage-spread throughout 
the different sectors (Lundh, 2010). This development also contributed to changes in the 
relationship between employer and SP’s. The employers, due to fear of increased labour-
related conflicts backed away from demanding radical reformational change - whilst the SP’s 
in fear of increased state regulation and intervention agreed to changes in the wage bargaining 
system (Baccaro & Howell, 2011). 
The mark as instruction 
Current wage-formation is based on Swedish macro-economic prerequisites for wage 
development and global competitiveness (Medlingsinstitutet, 2019). The Industry agreement, 
formed in 1997 (revised in 2011 and 2016) was launched as a new model impacting the 
structure of collective agreements, conflict resolution and wage-negotiations between SP’s 
within the industry (Industriradet, 2017). The agreement was formed as a response to 
increased wages in EU and a desire to keep the inflation- and unemployment levels low 
(Industriradet, 2017). In regards to wage-formation, the Industry agreement states that 
increase employment costs must be put in relation to global development. The industry 
prerequisites and the Mark thereby became the benchmark for wage-formation once more, 
although this time in a local adaptive decentralised wage-formation model (Lundh, 2010). The 
reason behind the Mark setting the norm for wage-formation for other sectors was due to the 
export industry income (equal to half of the Swedish BNP) and the fact that one in four 
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employees were employed within the industry, making the sector influential (Industriradet, 
2017). 
Critique against “the mark” as norm 
Using the Mark as norm creates a consensus between employers and SP’s involved. However, 
the centrally negotiated percentages aimed at creating stability and inhibit wage drifts makes 
employers’ compelled to re-distribute budget in line with stated percentage for yearly wage 
increases (Hermansson, 2019). Also, the rigidity of the Industry agreement leaves little room 
for individual solutions and that more consideration need to be taken to the state of the labour 
market or the organisation itself rather than the industry export (Calmfors, 2018; Gunnars, 
2018, January 24; Gunnars, 2017, December 14). Calmfors (2018) argues that the norm of the 
Mark is inflicting shame on actors in other sectors deviating from this norm upheld by the 
labour market parties and societal pressure.  
According to Karlsson et. al. (2014) the Mark creates mental barriers affecting decentralised 
wage-agreements, hindering a reformation of the current wage-formation model in play.  The 
norm of the Industry agreement is also questioned by Danielsson Öberg and Öberg (2017) 
stating that the implementation of the Mark as norm has shifted the power balance between 
SP’s and employer. Employers are using the Mark as a roof for wage increase with the norm 
as explanation, giving the employer increased power over the development of real-wages. 
This statement is confirmed by Karlsson et. al.’s (2014) case studies, showing that the 
majority of the organisations researched used the Mark as alibi treating it as the roof in their 
yearly wage increases. Critique is also directed towards employers signing, and agreeing to 
increases above the Mark, since that according to Anders Weihe is viewed as an act of 
irresponsibility and should be viewed as a “breach of the internal rules”, which should lead to 
fines for employers involved (Jelmin & Tun Hedfors, 2019, May 3; Lindström, 2019, May 3). 
Local wage-formation 
Collective- and wage-agreements stipulate the processes and criteria’s for wage setting 
(Björklund et. al., 2014).  Signing a collective agreement creates order and peace for the 
agreed period, but it also stipulates rules of conduct for the parties involved resulting in lower 
transaction costs for the company (Karlsson et. al., 2014). However the size of the company 
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matters - smaller companies might avoid signing collective agreements if they lack the 
organisational ability to meet their requirements (Karlsson et. al., 2014). Collective 
agreements gives different models of wage-formation possibilities with varying degrees of 
centralisation going from general increases (centralised wage-formation) to numberless 
agreement (localised wage-formation) (Karlsson et. al., 2014; Lundh, 2010; 
Medlingsinstitutet, 2019). The higher degree of centralisation - the less ability for 
differentiated pay at local level. One explanation is lack of local consideration inhibiting 
adaptations on an organisational level (Karlsson et. al., 2014). However, both Granqvist and 
Regnér (2016) and Medlingsinstitutet (2019) show that there are little to no difference in 
wage development between the different agreements, and that it is rather promotion or job 
rotation that is key for individual salary increase. 
Flexible wage models 
Globalisation, specialised workforces and less hierarchical organisations have lead to 
increased demand for flexible wage models. As a result, numberless agreements were 
introduced (Granqvist & Regnér, 2008). This created an option for employers to disregard 
centrally stipulated wage increase (i.e. the Mark) and instead make local wage-agreements 
based on the ability of the organisation (e.g. market, competitiveness, investments and profit 
margins) (Björklund et. al., 2014). In numberless agreements or process-agreement, as they 
are also called, both wage-formation space and individual distribution is decentralised without 
interference from SP’s on peak level. These agreements describes the process on how the 
salary review is to be conducted and stipulates that if the SP’s and the employer can not agree 
on local level, the centrally negotiated wage space is to be used. These process-agreements 
can include an individual fall back guarantee if negotiated with the local SP in the 
organisation (Granqvist & Regnér, 2016; Lundh, 2010). However, according to Karlsson et. 
al. (2014), these individual fall back guarantees inhibits differentiated wage-spread limiting 
the wage space available. 
Differentiated pay, determined locally by employers, is the norm for employees’ in the 
Swedish service industry due to increased demands for cost efficiency, flexible employment 
and rationalisation (Bengtsson, 2008; Granqvist & Regnér, 2008; Larsson, Ulfsdotter 
Eriksson & Adolfsson, 2017). It is primarily the individual performance that are of 
importance when the yearly state sanctioned salary reviews are performed, as compensation 
7 
for market factors and job-demands was offered when entering the employment contract 
(Aleite, 2013). It is only when an individual enter a new work position that all of the factors 
(i.e. market, individual performance and job-demands) are taken into consideration again 
(Aleite, 2013).  
It is therefore important for organisations to create a high degree of perceived fairness for the 
wage process and communicate their salary-determining politics and procedure towards their 
employees (Gevrek, Spencer, Hudgins & Chambers, 2017; Lundh, 2010). The risk of not 
creating a perceived fairness of the process is in the end employee turnover, as perceived 
fairness amongst employees is almost more important than the raise itself according to 
Gevrek et. al. (2017). 
Social partners 
The SP’s of industrial relations are operating on different hierarchical levels on the Swedish 
labour market (e.g. opinion making peak level and business near local level). According to 
Lundh (2010) SP’s on peak level function as cartels by affecting supply and demand where 
SP’s for employees, on the one hand, strive to increase wages with the threat of strike and 
lockouts. SP’s for employers, on the other hand, strive to keep wages down by a non-
competitive wage-formation amongst its organisational members. These dichotomous 
relations increase the incentive for both sides to sign collective agreements, due to the 
included obligation to keep the industrial peace throughout the collective agreements time of 
validity (Lundh, 2010). 
SP’s on peak level have different ideologies concerning wage formation. SP’s for employers 
believe that wage formation should be based on business near and local solutions. This is due 
to monetary compensations effect on employee motivation and performance impacting the 
results of the business (Svenskt Naringsliv, 2019). On the employee side ideologies differ. 
One explanation, according to Björklund et. al. (2014), is that trade unions are historically 
divided into two traditions where SP associations either believe that wage should be 
differentiated and based on local process-agreements without individual guarantees stipulated 
(Medlingsinstitutet, 2019). Or that wage-formation needs to follow the norm set by the 
industry adding stipulated numbers in both local and central wage-agreements 
(Medlingsinstitutet, 2019).  
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On an organisational level both strains of SP’s are involved in either processes of wage-
negotiation or wage-conversation. Both processes are reciprocal towards the local situation of 
the business. However, they differ in form - as wage-conversation rely upon the agreement 
between the employee and the employer evaluating the performance of the employee; while 
wage-negotiation often rely on centrally stipulated numbers of wage increase that the 
employers are regulated by if the agreement between the employer and the local SP’s are not 
satisfactory.  
According to Baccaro and Howell (2011) and Ingham (2008) industrial relations in 
collaborative market economies (henceforth known as CME’s) in Europe are on a trajectory 
of infusing liberal market economies (henceforth known as LME’s) characteristics in their 
relationship with SP’s. The power balance has shifted in favour of the employer, and 
weakened collective institutions together with weakened labour legislation are leading to 
institutional change. Bengtsson (2008) argues that this shift in power balance could lead to 
increased employee loyalty towards the employer while decreasing solidarity with the 
collective (i.e. SP’s for employees). Baccaro and Howell (2011) states that this movement 
towards neoliberalism and institutional deregulation is characterised by decentralised 
collective bargaining and individual wage-negotiation between employer and employee 
instead of employer and SP. One example is employers and/or SP’s being given exemptions 
from central collective agreements (e.g. numberless agreements). However, Bengtsson (2008) 
argues that there are indications that Sweden is not heading towards neo-liberalisation 
showing in his research that employees see SP’s as crucial when it comes to wage-negotiation 
due to the limitations in individual impact on wage increase -  legitimising SP’s presence in 
local wage-formation.  
Baccaro and Howell (2011) argues that the development in Sweden, going from centralised to 
decentralised bargaining and the shift towards individualisation has changed the role and 
power of the SP’s (Baccaro & Howell, 2011, Lundh, 2010). Even though still having an 
impact on wage-formation, SP’s are weakened by loss of coverage transforming their role to 
implementers, legitimisers and monitors of employer activities rather than the opposing 
negotiator as of past (Baccaro & Howell, 2011). Adding to that, the transition towards flexible 
wage-formation models in Sweden has weakened the bargaining power of SP’s (Bengtsson, 
2008). 
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Theory 
This article investigates how Employers and SP’s navigate through wage-formation 
discourses. According to theory, Sweden has been defined as a CME where reciprocity, 
collaboration and central negotiations of wage-formation are the norm (Hall & Soskice, 
2001). Still, Baccaro and Howell (2011, 2017) claim that neoliberal development and 
decentralised bargaining are signs of Sweden shifting towards a LME. As this study focus on 
the engineering consultancy sector, its knowledge-intensive fast changing flexibility could 
also be interpreted as a movement towards liberalisation containing criterions of organisations 
involved in LME’s (e.g. competitive compensation politics) (Hall & Soskice, 2001). It could 
also be perceived as complicated for organisations to use strategic wage-formation due to 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions (Scott, 2014) present on the market 
today. 
To handle this multileveled complexity of present institutions, this research will use 
institutional theory (Scott, 2014) and Hall and Soskice (2001) LME/CME theorisation as a 
way to pinpoint plausible discrepancies in the discourse(s) concerning wage-formation. 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory is referring to why things in certain contexts are the way they are. Scott 
(2014) explains how e.g. founders of organisations often keep to their original ideas (i.e. path-
dependency) – even when the society around the organisation is moving in opposite direction 
creating a situation where diffusion of ideas and/or procedures are counteracted. This path-
dependency could, according to this research’s interpretation, also be applied upon 
organisations such as SP’s on peak level determining regulations others’ are expected to 
follow. The institutions are in turn reliant upon different agents (i.e. nation states, 
organisations and/or professions) that carry and uphold the institutions with the help of 
different carriers (i.e. symbolic-, relational-, artifacts- and/or activities) (Scott, 2014).  
Institutional theory, according to Scott (2014), relies on the pillars of regulative, normative 
and cultural-cognitive institutions that create the basis of why individuals, organisations and 
societies around the world are following certain traditions, procedures and/or regulations. The 
regulative pillar is connected to the upholding of rules, that if not upheld correctly will result 
10 
in guilt and sanctions from governing parties. The normative pillar is closely connected to 
what would be perceived as the right thing to do, in any given situation, and will result in 
shame if one chooses alternative options. The cultural-cognitive pillar is connected to 
traditions, originating out of strong beliefs of long-lived ”ways to do” that are taken for 
granted and in turn creates insecurity and/or ambiguity if questioned. 
Furthermore, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) distinguish degrees of diffusion (i.e. how certain 
actions and/or mind-sets are spread and win legitimacy between actors) and competitive or 
institutional isomorphism (i.e. homogenisation amongst organisations facing the same 
challenges). The difference between competitive- and institutional isomorphism is on the one 
hand to compete for political power or institutional legitimacy (i.e. competitive isomorphism); 
and on the other - the resemblance of organisations is due to organisations being forced into 
alignment to the external context of which they are operating in (i.e. institutional 
isomorphism) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). There are also definitions of what type of pressure 
that makes organisations align or choose to apply certain actions, processes or mind-sets - 
resulting in isomorphism. Those pressures are defined as: Coercive (i.e. action taken with the 
cause of following regulations in order to avoid guilt); Normative (i.e. action taken through 
choice of e.g. benchmarking others in order to avoid shame of not following the market); and 
Mimetic (i.e. action taken through experience-based practices as standard solutions in order to 
avoid uncertainty) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
However, there are strands within institutional theory as socially constructed phenomenons 
that point towards the importance of a linguistic and non-taxonomic approach, through e.g. 
discourse analysis, in order to look upon the creation and upholding of institutions through the 
meaning of spoken and/or written word (Phillips & Malhotra, 2017). Criticism has been 
raised by Phillips and Malhotra (2017) concerning differences in ontological foundations and 
the presence of politics/power and governance of self-interest included in Scott’s (2014) three 
pillars of institutions. 
Coordinated market economies and Liberal market economies 
CME’s can according to Hall and Soskice (2001) be described as coordination through 
interactive relationships between market actors. CME’s are relying on support from 
institutions (e.g. regulative systems facilitating collaboration and SP’s on peak level) and 
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other organisation in coordinating actions. As examples, Sweden and Germany are defined by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) as CME’s. LME’s on the other hand can, according to Hall and 
Soskice (2001), be described as competitive in climate, where competitive market 
arrangements and hierarchy is coordinated at distance with little influence from the state. 
Great Britain and USA are examples of LME’s defined by Hall and Soskice (2001).   
Organisations operating within CME’s are more likely to monitor behaviours, exchange 
information and enforce sanctions on actors breaking cooperation (Hall & Soskice, 2001). In 
these economies organisations develop strategies based on coordination between each other 
instead of adhering to market forces alone (Hall & Soskice, 2001). SP’s in CME’s have strong 
influence, for example negotiating equal wages on the market. SP’s in CME’s also functions 
as advocates for employee’s to turn to when discriminated or treated unfairly by their 
employer (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Operating within LME’s, organisations are often governed 
by top management, having a liberal approach towards SP’s where SP’s have little influence 
or power. Competitive wage setting against competitors and being vulnerable to market forces 
are amongst the characteristics of LME’s (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
Critique against the field of comparative political economy claims that the argued resilience 
and regulating role of national institutions isolating CME’s and LME’s from similar economic 
pressures needs to be questioned (Baccaro & Howell, 2017). Baccaro and Howell (2017) 
argues that the explanation that path-dependency and history is inhibiting national political 
economic transformation in common directories ignores the global pressure of increase 
liberalisation seen throughout European CME’s today (Baccaro & Howell, 2017).  
Method 
Our research relies upon an explorative abductive approach with an understanding that the 
reality is created out of contextual factors that shape individual understandings reliant upon 
individual experiences (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Sharma, 2010; Winther Jörgensen & Phillips, 
2002). It is a qualitative interview study of the existing discourse(s) concerning wage- 
formation and potential factors affecting the concept of wage. The empirical data consists of 
qualitative narratives originating from interviews with Employers and SP’s, active in the 
engineering consultancy sector. This paper thereby attempts to visualise existing discourses 
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concerning wage-formation and influence of the Mark on Employers ability to use strategic 
wage-formation in local practice.  
This research is inspired by and uses an adapted approach of grounded theory (Charmaz, 
2014) and critical discourse analysis (Winther Jörgensen & Phillips, 2002) in order to fill the 
perceived gap in research concerning discourses and the way Employers and SP’s talk about 
wage-formation. The study choose to be inspired by discourse analysis as a model due to the 
importance of visualising the way we reproduce certain phenomenons through text or talk. 
This means that the way people talk about specific phenomena are never objective or natural; 
Instead talk and text is filled with meaning constructed in our daily conversations, which is 
why it is important to show the construction of these discourses (Bryman, 2011; Phillips & 
Malhotra, 2017; Winther Jörgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
Data collection 
Population 
Sampling of respondents was established through targeted selection, via company websites, 
and snowball sampling through previous contacts (Bryman, 2011). The researched sector 
contains Employers and three levels of SP’s on peak level from both employer and employee 
side that shape opinions, societal- and sometimes political discourses concerning the inner 
parts of collective agreements and wage-formation agreements in Sweden.  
The population representing SP’s with knowledge of peak- and local level consists of six 
individuals (two women and four men) that possess a tenure of between four and 16 years in 
respective work-roles (i.e. Ombudsman/negotiators, Wage-formation-experts and Collective 
agreement-specialists). The respondents were chosen due to their organisational roles and 
explicit knowledge of the mid- (negotiating level) and top level (opinion-making level) of 
wage-formation, representing their organisations towards several thousands of member 
organisations and several hundreds of thousands of individual trade union members. 
The population representing the Employers consists of nine individuals (five women and four 
men) originating out of seven individual engineering consultancy organisations in the size of 
between approximately 14 and 10 000 employees’ in Sweden. Individuals chosen as 
respondents have senior positions (i.e. HR-director/manager, Chief financial officer or Chief 
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executive officer) within the organisations and possess between five and 20 years of tenure in 
their working roles connected to wage-formation. The organisations chosen to participate in 
this study was pinpointed through either having opted out of being connected- (one 
organisation), or choosing to be connected (six organisations) to a collective agreement active 
on the Swedish engineering consultancy market.  
Interviews 
The empirical data originates out of eleven qualitative semi-structured interviews with 15 
SP’s and Employers, strategically selected due to their expertise of wage-formation in the 
context of the Swedish engineering consultancy market (Bryman, 2011). The interviews 
lasted between 45 and 137 minutes and were carried out via six Skype interviews, three face-
to-face interviews and two phone interviews. Two of the face-to-face interviews were carried 
out in company meeting-rooms while the third was carried out in a social area and suite, in the 
midst and in full view/hearing range of other offices close by. The phone and Skype 
interviews were carried out in study-rooms made available by the university. To be able to 
avoid respondent feeling inhibited by a secondary language (i.e. English), the interviews was 
conducted in Swedish. As a result, quotations used in the results section have been translated 
from Swedish to English by the authors of the paper. 
Interview guide 
The interview guide contained four main areas of questions aimed for both Employers and 
SP’s: Background questions - questions concerning individual characteristics, such as tenure 
in position but also the respondents individual interpretation of central concepts - such as the 
Mark, numberless agreements, individual wage-determination, individual fall back guarantees 
and variable wage. Thereafter, the interview questions searched for answers in connection to 
these central concepts in three parts: Introductory questions - questions concerning the 
purpose of- and how their organisation worked with the central concepts. Perspective of 
market parties - questions concerning what the potential up- and downsides were with-, what 
the response was towards- and who/what parties might be asking for the central concepts. 
Organisation specific questions - questions concerning what the most important message in 
the organisation’s wage-politics was? What challenges, related to wage-formation, were up-
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and-coming in the future? What potential future agreements could look like and be focused 
on. 
Analytical approach 
This research revolves around macro and meso levels where discussions in the empirical data 
concern the notion, the function and the practical use of the Mark. This research used 
inductive coding with the help of Charmaz’s (2014) line-by-line initial coding in order to 
proceed towards focused coding in order to grasp the complex discussions and intertwined 
narratives originating out of sometimes opposing employer and employee SP’s reflecting 
upon the same phenomenon’s. 
Thematisation 
Each empirically found theme was filled with three or four sub-themes, which meant that 
“talk” and/or discussions around certain topics compose the central themes of defined 
discourses. The central themes found in the empirical data is: (1) The Mark as political, which 
includes talk concerning factors of regulation, control and limitations - in the search for 
legitimacy and avoidance of guilt according present regulations; (2) The Mark as legitimacy, 
which includes talk and factors of transparency, appropriateness and fairness - in the search 
for honour and avoidance of shame in the interdependent relationship between Employers and 
SP’s; (3) The Mark as ideology, which includes talk and factors surrounding history, tradition 
and “having a standard procedure” to potential challenges - in the search for certainty and 
avoidance of ambiguity (in relation to outcome); and (4) Challenging the existence of the 
Mark, which includes talk and factors of the Marks future presence (i.e. market influence), 
existence and development in relation to societal trends of individualism. 
Credibility and transferability 
According to Winther Jörgensen and Phillips (2002) the objective truth does not exist in 
discourse analysis, as the discourses originates out of social constructivism and departs from 
social agreements influenced by our own preconceptions. All knowledge is thereby subjective 
since reality and context is created via language and should therefore not be taken for granted.  
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In line with the reasoning of Winther Jörgensen and Phillips (2002) this research’s aim is 
therefore not to claim the study to represent an objective truth, but instead be interpreted as an 
example of the situation studied. However, as the process and practice of wage-formation is 
general in use, we speculate that there ought to be similar occurrences in other sectors active 
in the fast moving and knowledge intensive Swedish labour market.  
Taking this into consideration we argue that the findings of this study is transferable to 
contexts outside of the investigated sector of engineering consultancy, as the investigated 
phenomenon is of widespread national character - leading to possible replicability in other 
sectors of the Swedish labour market. To limit the influence of our own unconscious 
preconceptions and biases we have throughout the research continuously discussed our 
interpretations of collected empirical data and use thereof. 
Limitations 
This research chose to limit its population to the sphere of the engineering consultancy sector 
in Sweden. The decision to research this specific sector was made due to (1) the sectors high 
presence of negotiated wage-agreements containing individual fall back guarantees 
(Medlingsinstitutet, 2019); and (2) the similarity in characteristics amongst specialist white-
collar organisations active in the service sector in Sweden (i.e. profit-driven, high pace and 
knowledge intensive). Thereby, the choice of population creates the opportunity to provide 
probabilities and tendencies that ought to be transferable towards larger groups on the market 
scene. This research will thereby solely focus upon engineering consultancy organisations and 
their affiliated SP’s, or lack thereof. 
This research needed to handle the accessibility factor towards sought population – i.e. senior 
management and/or geographically outplaced population (in some cases based abroad). 
Therefore, this research chose to conduct eight out of eleven interviews with the help of 
various mediums (i.e. Skype and/or phone - in some cases with camera function enabled). 
This resulted in not being able to “sense the surroundings and/or body language”, as would be 
the case in face-to-face interviewing. However, without the help of technology to gain access 
this research would not have been possible within the economic- and timeframe available.  
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Due to the fact that we have chosen to only interview SP’s on macro (peak) and meso level, 
the discourses presented are not taking into account the views of local SP’s operating within 
the engineering consultancy organisations nor employees and their notion and perception of 
the effect of the Mark on wage-formation. 
Ethical considerations 
This research has considered the criterions of information, consent, confidentiality and use of 
empirical data towards involved respondents (Bryman, 2011; Swedish research council, 
2017). When reaching out to potential population a letter of information regarding the purpose 
of the study was attached. In addition to this, in connection with the interviews an agreement 
of participation was given to each respondent making sure the respondent understood the 
purpose of the study that participation was voluntary, that their anonymity was being kept and 
that the empiric result was only going to be used in this study.  
It is reflected upon, by the authors of this study, that having similar academic merits (i.e. BSc 
in HRM & Labour relations) could create interpretations that could be affected and shaped by 
earlier experiences and educational background, as described by Wolcott (1994). The study 
also needed to be aware of the subjective choices of structuring and stratification of 
respondents due to organisational belonging, as this research through the results will try to 
display “how things are” according to narratives originating out of the stratified dimensional 
perspectives (Winther Jörgensen & Phillips, 2002). The discourse results (i.e. representations 
of groups) does not exist before being classified and put forward as statements, which pose 
the risk of others using classifications and results out of context and aim of this study 
(Winther Jörgensen & Phillips, 2002). This fact has to be kept in mind when conclusions are 
drawn and statements are presented towards external parties. 
Results 
The results section is built up by reasoning, talk and discussions surrounding the Mark as 
something Employers and/or SP’s on both local- and peak level relate to when performing or 
relating to the process of wage-formation. The results section contains four main themes 
concerning the notion of the Mark, more precisely: The Mark as political; The Mark as 
legitimacy; The Mark as ideology; and Challenging the Mark. 
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1. The mark as political 
This theme and the notion of politics is constructed by discussions concerning stability and 
the Mark’s effect for Employers, containing talk such as the Mark’s tendency to regulate, 
control and limit actions in a strive to avoid guilt according to national- and local regulations.  
Wage-formation, both centrally and locally, is strongly influenced by discussions concerning 
the Mark. There is a consensus amongst the respondents regarding the perceived purpose of 
the Mark as creating stability, responsible wage-formation and prevent wage drifts on the 
Swedish labour market (cf. Lundh, 2010). One SP on peak level expresses the notion of Mark 
as follows: 
We call it the industry mark. In common words “The mark“. When it first 
began the purpose was to create a wage-formation norm, a societal norm for 
what the economy could handle in terms of wage increases, and in practice 
this is determined by the export industry […] (SP_A). 
Market stability 
In line with Björklund et. al. (2014) and Lundh (2010), respondents see an advantage of 
having consensus regarding a normative wage-formation in the Mark’s ability to create 
stability in preventing strikes and employers outbidding each other on the market.  
Since we have conflict rules that give unions an enormous power to strike 
[...] if you would not have this norming ‘mark’, many would have higher 
demands upon wage increases. And then we would be back to the time 
before the creation of the industry-agreement, where parties outbid each 
other [...] and everything becomes a huge mess that scamper (SP_D). 
[...] there is a calmer negotiation if there is a starting-point. We are now on 
the last year of a three year agreement. So in some ways you know where to 
start, it is quite calm negotiations and not situations where one [party in the 
local wage-negotiation] says one [1 percent] and the other says seven 
percent (Employer_5). 
However, there are views amongst the respondents of the Mark’s stabilising tendencies as an 
inhibiting force (cf. Calmfors, 2018; Hermansson, 2019) for differentiated wage-formation in 
the context of wage-spread; “The positive is that it [the Mark] is reductive [in holding back 
irresponsible wage-formation], and the negative is total ‘levelling off’ and pacification of the 
wage-formation” (SP_D). While on the other side, emphasised by respondents on both sides, 
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there is a lack of better alternatives to use in order to create sustainable stability on the 
market.  
You need to remember that ‘the mark’ is not a law, it is free for any 
employee- and employer association to try to sign an agreement that is 
lower or higher than ‘the mark’ stipulates. There are attempts being made 
from time to time, so you can try to challenge it - but so far everyone has 
recognised that it is better to follow ‘the mark’ than to start some kind of 
war towards an unknown territory with unclear goals (SP_B). 
The Mark’s stabilising force is thereby something sought by respondents in order to predict 
and plan future endeavours. However, respondents describe that the strong normative effect of 
the Mark is not always the best in the strive for local agreements; disagreeing with Anders 
Weihe, head of negotiations at Teknikföretagen, who states that diverging from the Mark 
should be viewed as a breach of contract (Jelmin & Tun Hedfors, 2019, May 3; Lindström, 
2019, May 3). 
The Mark’s effect for Employers 
From a service sector perspective, the fixed normative effect of the Mark has the disadvantage 
of not adapting to local needs and instead becomes a starting point of the market situation 
concerning wages; “The advantage is that you get comparable wage increases in several 
sectors. The disadvantage is that you don’t adapt it [the Mark] to local sectorial needs.” 
(Employer_2). This could be in line with Karlsson et. al.’s (2014) description of the Mark’s 
tendency of creating mental barriers that inhibit decentralised wage-agreements. 
Employers also described the complexity of meeting employee expectations, while at the 
same time taking cyclical movement and potential recessions into account, making the 
Employers prefer process-agreements over the strict use of the Mark. “[The Mark] becomes 
the floor quite easily, everyone expects to get 2,3% and if you get under that you are a loser 
so to speak. And that becomes governing, even in a recession we expect to end up on that 
level.” (Employer_1). Respondents describe that there is a tendency for organisations to get 
fixated to stipulated numbers in agreements; “This is why the service-sector has chosen NOT 
to have a stipulated number in its agreements, cause you know that organisations stick to the 
stipulated number.” (SP_C). 
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However, even with the use of process-agreements (cf. Granqvist & Regnér, 2016; Lundh, 
2010) the Mark is indirectly impacting the wage-formation on local level according to the 
respondents; “We have to relate to the central collective agreement and of course, that 
indirectly becomes ‘the mark’” (Employer_5). Adding to this complexity, due to the close 
link between the government’s stipulated goal of inflation and the Mark (cf. Lundh, 2010), it 
becomes difficult to disregard the Mark in wage-formation when deciding to not sign a 
collective agreement (cf. Karlsson et. al., 2014).  
Even Employers that in the strive to avoid being regulated by collective agreements and to 
offer more to their employees ends up benchmarking available market factors in order to offer 
a more competitive compensation solution; “We look at a couple of collective agreements, we 
look at inflation, we look at K84, we look at our earnings…Then the goal is to always be 
above the inflation during a period of three years.” (Employer_6). This shows that Employers 
in the search for legitimacy and fairness towards employees’ choose to benchmark centrally 
stipulated criterions (cf. Gevrek et. al., 2017; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Karlsson et. al., 2014; 
Lundh, 2010). 
2. The mark as legitimacy 
The theme of using the Mark for legitimacy is constructed out of talk, reasoning and 
discussions of the search for legitimacy and the changing role of SP’s. These topics contain 
factors of transparency, appropriateness and fairness in the search for honour and avoidance 
of shame in the interdependent relationship between Employers and SP’s.  
As we have seen, the mark creates stability and solidaric wage competitiveness (cf. Lundh, 
2010) in wage increases that affect almost all involved on the market. Even though there 
might be critique against using the Mark as reference, the empirical data shows that there are 
no better alternatives to use in order to gain the same or better results.   
The problem is not the critique against the mark, it is that no one has a better 
solution. People say ‘this is bad’, but how should you do instead? There is 
no one that can present a better alternative to the mark. Then it becomes 
hard to discuss the problems [concerning the mark] according to me (SP_B). 
Thereby, Employers and SP’s could be interpreted to use the Mark as a way of gaining 
legitimacy through transparency, appropriateness and fairness in their wage politics. This as a 
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result of Employers lack of alternatives when handling parallel wage-agreements (with and 
without stipulated percentages) originating out of dual union-traditions as described by 
Björklund et. al. (2014). 
The search for legitimacy 
One respondent describe that managers sometimes lack in knowledge of wage criterions 
included in performing local wage processes and choose “the easy way” for avoiding conflict; 
“[…] they [managers] are involved, not knowing the defined [wage] criterions and end up in 
‘oh-well, maybe I’ll give everyone ‘the mark’ – then I am a fair manager and no one will 
complain’.” (SP_C). This tendency of using the Mark as a cover protects the manager from 
having to deal with legitimacy and complaints relating to determined levels of wage increase. 
Thereby, there is a strong presence of perceived fairness and appropriateness in connection to 
organisational context when relating to companies ending up on or around the Mark.  
The respondents describe a tacit presence of the Mark in the wage-formation process due to 
the normality of having parallel agreements (one with and one without stipulated 
percentages). This is where the two traditions of trade unions (Björklund et. al., 2014) clash in 
what is perceived as “the best way”, where one tradition of employee SP on peak level 
describe: “[...] then it is good to have a ‘mark’ [the Mark] that is not up for debate” (SP_B). 
While the other tradition of trade union argue for numberless agreements without stipulated 
percentage, claiming that Employers tend to choose the agreement that is “easy to follow” 
(i.e. the one with stipulated percentages) as it is perceived as transparent and fair. The 
tendency of Employers choosing the agreement that is “easy to follow” hampers the move 
away from using the Mark, making the approach of SP traditions towards using the Mark in 
wage-formation pivotal when Employers choose “how to” perform local wage-formation. 
Furthermore, business-competitive processes of rationalisation and standardisation is also 
reflected upon as a cause of Employers not moving away from using the Mark as reference. 
When Employers are not able to create their own versions of the wage process, due to 
organisational size and/or economic factors, they tend to benchmark towards competitors in 
order to avoid transactional costs (cf. Björklund et. al., 2014; Karlsson et. al., 2014; Lundh, 
2010). This creates a situation of homogeneity amongst Employers where traditions (such as 
using the Mark) are being upheld when performing local wage-formation;  
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A lot is hygienic factors [wage-issues], cause we know that we have roughly 
the same reward-models and benefits as our competitors. That’s my 
obligation as a HR-manager in the frame of external environment 
monitoring, or else we risk losing people (Employer_3). 
To further problematise the Employers strive for legitimacy of its wage process is to add the 
layer of individual perceptions (cf. Gevrek et. al., 2017; Lundh, 2010). This is to handle the 
equilibrium between individual employees’ understandings (often created through general 
media) and the reality in the local organisational context throughout the wage-formation 
process. “[…] two percent is defined by ‘the mark’, that is what you [as an employee] should 
get if you are mediocre. But I’m [employee] not mediocre, so I should get more […].” 
(SP_C). This complexity is also supported when reasoning around the presence of the Mark 
through agreements of individual fall back guarantee: 
The thing with agreement with individual guarantee [stupstock] is that that 
level is really viewed as a lowest, lowest, lowest level if it is communicated 
[within the organisation] - and then everyone expects to get that level, at 
least! (Employer_2). 
As a contrast to the local and sometimes emotional side of wage, one respondent reflects upon 
a meeting on SP peak level and their discussion of wage:  
You don’t talk about wage in connection to feelings at all, it is more of a 
drawing chalk [krita] discussion. When I started to talk about these things 
[the emotional side of wage] participants started to twist in their chairs. You 
often view this as having a pouch of money that is to be distributed, and 
when this is done you work towards next year (SP_A). 
This dichotomous perception of wage-formation as being something “square-ish”, fair and 
calculable as opposed to individually and emotionally loaded creates a complexity for 
Employers and SP’s to balance in cooperative settings. There are two levels of legitimacy 
detected in wage-formation: one on peak level that show the two trade union traditions and 
the way Employers handle the situation, and one on local level that shows the importance of 
interdependent relationships as developed below. 
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The role of social partners 
In order to create legitimacy and communicate a common salary setting process throughout 
the organisation it is pivotal for Employers and local SP’s to cooperate (cf. Baccaro & 
Howell, 2011, 2017; Svenskt Naringsliv, 2019).   
And the unions, here we agree to try to help each other and that it becomes 
some sort of organisational development where the unions help their 
members clarify the [salary] criterions and such and how to interpret [the 
criterions] and the arguments to bring forth… (Employer_3). 
The relationship with local SP’s thereby have an impact on the local adaption of the process-
agreement and the aim of moving away from the Mark. The maturity of the relationship 
creates a climate where local adaptation can take place in confidence, whereas Employers 
with new or non-existing local SP’s often get fixated upon centrally stipulated numbers, such 
as the Mark.  
Because it’s clear in the agreements what the salary criterions are and then it 
is impossible to lose your way, it’s about interpretations and knowledge 
surrounding the agreements. There are social partners who has been around 
a long time and are very knowledgeable, and then there are those who has 
not done that – and then you often get stuck in old principles and old 
arguments…it’s more about the maturity on local an individual level – also 
in the relationship towards the employer (Employer_3). 
The SP’s on peak level also discussed the power shift in the relationship between Employer 
and SP’s, reflecting on their roles in the context of local wage-formation. SP’s on local level 
are in fact moving from their traditional and oppositional role (cf. Baccaro & Howell, 2011, 
2017) towards the function of monitoring, helping and educating the Employer and 
employees in setting up fair processes in the workplace.  
Historically, way back, even the unions was involved in handing out pieces 
of the cake – there were no salary talks, only wage determination talks. Now 
there is an understanding that you need to be a little closer to reality so now 
you have salary talks where you talk [about salary], but in the end it is the 
employer who decides. Our role as social partner is to make sure no one is 
being discriminated or disadvantaged (SP_C). 
This shift in power was further problematised by SP’s on peak level enforcing individual fall 
back guarantees into wage-agreements in order to avoid potential abuse of power from 
Employers. 
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The challenge with numberless agreements, if there would be totally 
numberless agreements [agreements without any stipulated percentage of 
wage-increase], is that the ones that decide over the money is not the 
employees – it is the employer. The power balance thereby gets shifted to 
the advantage of the employer. But let’s say that the employees could be 
part of deciding the wage space - which they don’t get to do - then it would 
be a different situation. But it isn’t the employees who decide over the 
budget, it’s the employer. That is why a totally numberless agreement would 
lead to the [power] balance shifting in a way that is not acceptable for us 
(SP_B). 
The presence of individual fall back guarantees is dual, and according to Karlsson et. al. 
(2014) it is hindering the by Employers sought wage differentiation. Furthermore, this 
research contemplates if it could also be interpreted to legitimise SP’s presence as employee 
spokespersons towards their trade union members. This impacts the way SP’s adapt their 
message in order to motivate their specific target group, i.e. Employers or local union 
clubs/members. 
3. The mark as ideology 
This theme and the notion of ideology is constructed of discussions relating to rhetoric’s and 
adaptations of SP’s message towards their target group in the strive to transcend historic 
influences. Influences containing factors such as history, tradition and the tendency of 
standard solutions in the strive for certainty and avoidance of ambiguity.  
As we have seen, official and/or in-official regulations with the aim of creating stability and 
legitimacy on different levels (i.e. national, sectorial and/or organisational) of the market, are 
on a local level to a high degree relying on the interdependent relationships between 
Employers and local SP’s. However, there are some discrepancies and attempts to transcend 
and challenge the historically and traditionally based rhetoric’s, concepts and understandings 
that shape the way the respondents talk and relate to wage-formation in Sweden.  
Rhetoric’s in wage-formation 
It became apparent from the interviews that the use of semantics and re-framing of key wage-
formation concepts was widely adapted. For example, the term Mark was referred to by the 
respondents as: “the industry mark” (SP_A) and “the wage-formation mark” (SP_D); The 
term numberless agreements was referred to as: “business near agreement” (SP_D) and 
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“agreement without centrally defined numbers” (SP_C); and the term agreement of individual 
fall back guarantee was referred to (when included in a agreement) as: “process-agreement” 
(SP_B).  
As shown, the re-framing of traditional terms put an individual focus and adapted objective in 
the re-framed terminology and its actual function. Receiving answers to questions concerning 
the relation towards the Mark portray a perceived tension in ideology behind used definitions 
and wordings: “Export-mark? No, I don’t know what that is. The wage-formation mark 
however, if that is what you are referring to…? I can describe that.” (SP_D). 
The differences in used rhetoric’s show a tacit power-struggle between SP’s on peak level – 
as the SP’s by default propose sometimes opposing objectives of either saving costs for 
Employers or raising wage-levels for union-members. “So, one could argue that it is almost 
about political ideologies that clash when the creation of ‘the mark’ for next agreement period 
is at hand.” (SP_C). 
Transcending historic influences 
Rhetoric’s, such as described above, have a direct affect on the organisational level where 
Employers’ sometimes choose not to use wordings, or re-frame the use of historic terms in 
order to not get stuck in the historic and traditional meanings and conceptions of the terms. 
I try not to talk about it [the mark] as it is not supposed to be the driving 
force, it should be differentiated wage-determination. But we always end up 
over it so we don’t talk about it as much anymore (Employer_1). 
Then you get into the classic rhetoric’s of what you call it, I choose not to 
use those wordings as you might have recognised, we talk about wage 
space. We don’t talk about a mark, it is totally uninteresting in the wage-
discussion, and this is where you loose yourself as a manager (Employer_3). 
The strive to transcend historic influences and win support by using “the right words” when 
motivating members with adapted terminology, such as “the wage-formation-mark”, 
“business near agreements” (SP_D) and “agreement without centrally defined numbers” 
(SP_C), shows the inner parts of the wish to reconfigure the use and meaning of traditional 
terms. 
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The development of performing wage-conversations rather than wage-negotiations is a clear 
example of transcending relations on the market. This as wage-conversations includes leaving 
the Mark and moving towards numberless agreements that have an emphasis on local 
conditions without central involvement. However, Employers in this study describe the 
transition away from wage-negotiations with challenges in changing the employee mind-set 
from perceptions of the yearly wage process as a traditional wage-negotiation to the process 
as a wage-review. 
Yes, this is possibly the misconception. It [the wage-conversation] should of 
course have the form of a dialogue about fulfilling goals and the future, as 
well as what the employee think this is worth [in monetary means]. You 
should naturally talk about it, the conversation should not become a 
monologue, but in the end there is no demand to agree upon something 
(Employer_4). 
What you perform every day at work, this is how you can affect your wage-
revision, but you are not going to have a negotiation of a new wage-level 
every year. (Employer_7). 
The empirical data describe willingness towards flexibility through wage-conversations 
and/or process-agreements in the local wage-formation. However, the situations where local 
trade union associations are guaranteed a centrally stipulated percentage of wage increase (if 
local SP’s and Employers don’t agree) create a complex situation when trying to apply the 
more flexible numberless agreements.  
I want to claim something that perhaps is controversial; this is that there is 
no such thing as a numberless agreement in the whole of Sweden. This as a 
result of employers having parallel [wage] agreements on the workplace, 
one with and one without numbers, where the agreement with numbers 
affects the wage-formation for the company (SP_B). 
This creates a situation where the agreement of individual fall back guarantee often sets the 
floor in the local wage process. Even though SP’s in general say they would be prepared (if 
motivated properly) to agree upon a lower percentage if necessary, the same voices claim:  
In the end we all feel that we need the ‘stupstock’ in order to prevent being 
pushed into having to lower the wage-increases. And for this reason we 
have a mark that is not up for debate in wage-negotiations locally (SP_B).  
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The resistance in lowering expectations of wage increases is also confirmed by Employers: 
You can say that they [local union-parties] view it [the centrally stipulated 
percentage] as a floor. This is the case in the present situation of the big 
demand for civil-engineers on the market, so both parties [employer and 
local union party] start in the central [stipulated percentage] (Employer 5). 
The situation where the Mark is perceived as the floor (contradicting the findings of 
Danielsson Öberg and Öberg (2017) stating the opposite) is somewhat problematic. 
Transcending from centrally and collectively based stipulated percentages into local 
flexibility and individually based cooperation that disregard the Mark as reference pose 
challenges towards the function and use of the Mark. 
4. Challenging the existence of the mark 
This theme consists of empirical discussions and questions regarding the Mark’s future, 
existence and development in the light of societal trends moving from collectivism towards 
individualisation.  
To use the Mark as a guideline is being questioned (c.f. Calmfors, 2018; Danielsson Öberg & 
Öberg, 2017; Gunnars, 2017, December 14; Hermansson; 2019; Jelmin & Tun Hedfors, 2019; 
Karlsson et. al., 2014; Lundh, 2010). The transformation of wage-agreement characteristics is 
going from centralized to decentralized negotiations/conversations, where process-agreements 
are increasing in the service sector.  
There has been, and there is at the moment a discussion on how “the mark” 
should be handled – do we have to have “the mark”? Historically the mark 
has been negotiated in order to get a number into the collective agreement. 
But now the agreements have another construction – so the number isn’t 
really needed anymore. And then the question is do we need the mark? 
(SP_C). 
SP’s on peak level acknowledge this and state that the Mark’s constant presence becomes 
apparent when looking for differences in wage-spread between those using centralized- or 
numberless/process-agreements and recognising that there are no real difference to be found.   
Different agreements… An agreement with numbers becomes more 
governing, while with a numberless agreement you can discuss other 
factors. But when it comes to the actual outcome it is so dependent on the 
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societal norm that it has very little meaning what type of agreement you 
have (SP_A). 
According to respondents, there are discussions of who (what SP’s) should be invited to 
participate in determining the Mark. This as the white-collar service sector and blue-collar 
industry sector are equal in regards of trade union members (cf. Lundh, 2010). Furthermore, 
there is talk of inviting other, non industry SP’s, but it is hard to align interests of different 
sectors as the prerequisites of the sectors are somewhat different; where the industry sector 
could be interpreted as collectivistic and service sector individualistic in its approach. 
What is hindering people from gathering around it [the creation of the mark] 
I believe is quite natural. The market is so diverse, I speculate that those 
who work in modern internet based companies are not able to identify 
themselves with a situation where you sit down and put a price on the 
workforce in this way – cause their [modern internet based companies] 
conditions are totally different (SP_A). 
Towards individualisation 
The role of SP’s is discussed in terms of moving towards a individualised society that shift 
focus away from the collective approach that traditionally has been the focus of labour 
relations in the Swedish labour market. This individualised approach is thereby challenging 
wage-formation and the role of the SP’s going forward.  
But I can wish from my point of view that with maturity - that you go 
against wage processes with pay-setting conversations where it is 
individualised. That you move power from the central to the individual and 
that you have clear and transparent methods and tools in the wage 
process…. I mean the role of the unions it is that they have difficulty in 
asserting themselves with what value they add to their members. I see from 
my perspective - if I try to be a bit objective - then I still think that the 
development is towards more individual and more wage-setting 
conversations (Employer_3). 
And if you look close at society, collectivism is crumbling, and I think that 
happens here too. The union will probably have to find new roles, there is 
absolutely a role for them, but which. The question is if not wage-formation 
is becoming increasingly individualized in any way (Employer_5). 
The respondents’ discussion of individualisation or collective good and adaptation to local 
needs versus centralised governing was framed in the context of being able to use strategic 
wage-formation. However, the overarching strive to keep stability on the Swedish labour 
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market makes a normative Mark a strong incitement for all to gather around, especially while 
looking at macro-economic instability cycles.  
It’s good to have norms in the labour market. If there is no norm or if you 
don’t have a strong unionized wage setting, then the salaries will fluctuate 
depending on the economy. […] I believe that the next time we wind up in a 
recession we might very well end up gathering around a “mark” again, 
because then you want something to relate to or at least set your hope to 
(SP_A). 
This reasoning is in line with the findings of Baccaro and Howell (2011, 2017) and Bengtsson 
(2008) respectively, showing the push and pull factors between centralisation and 
decentralisation. This dichotomous relationship towards a collective norm versus localised 
arrangements emerged from the empirical findings and show examples of the complexity 
included in the relationship towards the Mark. 
Discussion 
This research’s purpose is to identify institutions and market forces through discourses 
concerning central and local wage-formation. This by being able to display talk, reasoning 
and/or discussions (i.e. discourses) around Employers and SP’s involved in the engineering 
consultancy sector, using the mark when performing wage-formation.  
In regards of meaning and historical development of the Mark, the findings of this study 
shows that sometimes ideological discourses (through semantics) take place amongst SP’s on 
peak level - and is diffused towards employers and local SP’s. SP’s on both employer and 
employee side describe the need and necessity of cooperation and flexibility, but at the same 
time recognise that those goals sometimes are opposite of each other (e.g. employer side wish 
to keep personnel-costs to a minimum while the employee side strive for increases in wage 
and general conditions for its members). On local level, amongst Employers, there are 
discourses of how to relate to the Mark and other market forces that encourage or inhibit the 
creation of locally centred and extended wage-agreements. The presence of parallel wage-
agreements creates tendencies of generalisation of treating all the employees the same for 
Employers. These tendencies and the strive for fairness, appropriateness and transparency 
hinders the, by the market, sought wage differentiation and spread. Thereby, this research puts 
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forward that actors involved on the market are upholding traditions by normative and cultural-
cognitive patterns (Scott, 2014). In the context of this study, the empirical data is interpreted 
to create context-bound discourses on central (i.e. macro) and local (i.e. meso) level of 
analysis.  
Macro-level 
When looking at the history and development of wage-formation in Sweden with the help of 
Lundh (2010), it becomes apparent that the main goal for wage-formation, i.e. the use of the 
Mark, in stabilising Swedish macro-economy and labour market - is still in full effect. From a 
macro-economic perspective the path-dependency of the “Swedish model” and the notion of 
solidaric wages, i.e. Sweden being a collaborative market economy, the Mark leads to 
institutional isomorphism  (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Lundh, 2010). 
This somewhat contradicts the findings of Baccaro and Howell (2011, 2017) and Ingham 
(2008) arguing for Sweden, as a CME, is moving towards neo-liberalisation - at least within 
this research’s chosen population. 
According to this research’s chosen population there are ongoing discussions amongst SP’s 
on peak level surrounding the legitimacy of how the determining of the Mark should be 
performed. Since the service sector is equal to the industry sector (both in terms of employees 
and trade union representation (Lundh, 2010) this practice is losing legitimacy, which create 
internal pressure to renegotiate the process and include SP’s from other sectors (sensitive to 
export) in the negotiation. The question of including SP’s, outside the industry sector, in 
determining the level of the Mark is a somewhat hot potato as traditional political hierarchy 
could be interpreted to play a vital role in who gets a say in the matter. 
One could argue that competitive isomorphism through a strive for (not losing) political 
influence and institutional legitimacy for the Mark is ever so present (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). To call upon sufficient others (Scott, 2014) in order to accredit the presence of and 
necessity of the Mark could, when looking through the lenses of coercive and normative 
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), display a picture of involved SP’s avoiding guilt or 
shame towards society in general, and market in particular. According to this research’s 
interpretation, this is where semantics and terminology (i.e. re-phrasing and/or the choice not 
to use certain terms in the discussion of wage-formation) enter the complexity. Here the 
30 
terminology is used for diffusion (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) in order to motivate 
stakeholders in the “right way” and in line with the often diverging goals of employees- and 
employers SP’s on peak level, as described by Björklund et. al. (2014). 
Meso-level 
This research speculates that there is a built in complexity of standardisation for engineering 
consultancy organisations in Sweden where, today, agreements with individual fall back 
guarantees is ever so present (Medlingsinstitutet, 2019). The standardisation is that of treating 
all employees the same, regardless of having parallel wage-agreements, and through treating 
everyone the same create legitimacy, transparency and fairness for the wage process – often 
ending up on the level of the Mark. Above keeping transactional cost to a minimum (Karlsson 
et. al. 2014; Lundh, 2010). As this research’s empirical data has shown, talk of benchmarking 
competitors and using competitive wage formation creates a dichotomous relation to claims of 
striving for differentiated wages and a healthy wage-spread throughout the market. 
Employers thereby use normative methods (Scott, 2014) in glancing towards competitors’ 
ways of doing, and adapting to the market through institutional isomorphism in order to stay 
competitive through normative and mimetic influenced standardisation (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). Since there are currently no replacement to the Mark in creating stability and 
predictability – everyone tries to do the best with what has proven effective through history, 
i.e. mimetic pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). This in order not to “rock the boat”, as 
“rocking the boat” and questioning traditions with a proven track-record might lead to 
unknown consequences and uncertainty (Scott, 2014). This could also be interpreted as CME 
forces in competition with LME influences (Hall & Soskice, 2001) where competitive market 
forces clash with institutional conformity. 
 Conclusions 
The discourses in connection to the Mark concerns: (1) The Mark as political, including talk 
of market stability, limiting tendencies and the credibility of the Mark; (2) The Mark as 
legitimacy, including talk of wage process legitimacy for Employers, as well as the 
development of roles for local SP’s; (3) The Mark as ideology, including talk of rhetoric’s and 
semantics when performing diffusion towards member organisations and/or local union clubs; 
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and (4) Challenging the Mark, including talk of societal and market trends moving from 
collectivism to individualism. 
Thereby, the established method of using the Mark as reference creates a situation where the 
mark becomes an in-official rule that in some ways is taken-for-granted (due to its historic 
and successful track record) as a traditional default setting (cf. Scott, 2014). The threat of 
recession and ensuring employers ability to carry employee costs in harsh times act as a wet 
blanket, making all actors unwilling to challenge status quo. 
Practical implications 
Is there still a need for a normative wage-formation Mark? The discourses emerging from our 
empirical data suggests both. One SP on peak level discussed the fear of moving towards an 
increased LME, as defined by Hall & Soskice (2001), where employer power would be to 
great if there were to be no guidelines stipulated in the wage-agreements. Employers on the 
other hand argued for the need of flexibility in the strive to handle challenges of scarcity of 
labour, seeking independence from a governing Mark. 
The empirical data shows the implications of Employers perceiving the Mark as a floor and 
unofficial rule, governing wage-formation in a local context. This could be an effect of local 
SP’s arguing for stipulated numbers in order to gain legitimacy towards their members. One 
could speculate that this originates from the transformation of SP’s, going from a traditional 
and often employee opposing role towards the function of implementation partner to the 
employers with a monitoring effect (Baccaro & Howell, 2011, Lundh, 2010). 
Final reflections 
In addition, the empirical data show tendencies of a perceived power imbalance between 
business actors (i.e. engineering consultancy organisations, client firms and individual 
consultants). This becomes clear when it comes to sustainable wage-formation and the 
equilibrium between earned fees from client firms and personnel costs. One direction of 
future research is thereby within the area of power relations included in negotiated business 
deals, where fees from client firms are under heavy structural price-pressure. This problem is 
according to this research’s collected empirical data a reality that most (if not all) local 
engineering consultancy firms in Sweden need to handle as a counterweight to wage increases 
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included in local wage-formation. To fully grasp and understand Employers ability to use 
strategic wage formation in a societal context we also argue that further research is needed, 
taking into account local SP’s and employee views of wage-formation as well as others 
outside of the service sector and the engineering consultancy sphere.  
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